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SERVING THE NEEDS OF BOTH THE CONSUMER OF LEGAL
SERVICES AND THE PROFESSION THROUGH THE
APPLICATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION
STATUTES TO LAWYERS
Richard A. Hesse and Mitchell M. Simon*
I. Introduction
Consumers of legal services are
caught in a time warp. Their rights
in a transaction with a lawyer are
the same as they were fifty years
ago. Meanwhile, those same consumers dealing with other sellers of
products and services enjoy a wide
variety of modern laws that protect
them from the realities of the marketplace. During the last fifty
years, lawyers have become increasingly business oriented as a
result of heightened competition in
the legal profession. Indeed, the
practice of law has become a business. The legal profession expresses concern about the effects of this
competitive climate on professionalism by warning that lawyers
should not behave like merchants.'
Despite the trend toward law as a
business, the practice of law has for
the most part been untouched by
consumer protection statutes that
govern other businesses.

Despite the trend toward
law as a business, the
practice of law has for the
most part been untouched
by consumer protection
statutes that govern other
businesses.
There is little question that for
the legal profession there is serious
trouble in paradise. The reputation
of the profession is unacceptably
low. In response, the legal profession has focused on productivity
and profitability rather than the
concerns of individual consumers.
Accordingly, the profession has established new professional regulations and slightly more sophisticated mechanisms for enforcing those
regulations. Meanwhile, consumers of legal services express great
frustration when they attempt to
hold lawyers accountable for in-

adequate legal service. This is not
new. What is new is the presence of
consumer-oriented groups focused
on dealing with the legal profession. Their message is clear: Even
if the profession's efforts to protect
the public through self-regulatory
and disciplinary schemes are effective, those efforts do not provide a
remedy for the individual consumer of legal services.
This article takes the position
that application of consumer protection statutes to attorneys will
supplement traditional common
law remedies and provide more
complete protection to consumers
injured by inadequate legal services that frustrate legitimate expectations. Not incidentally, enforcement of consumer rights will also
improve professional behavior.
First, the article examines the consumer's traditional common law
remedies. Second, the article analyzes the various approaches that
the courts take in resolving the
applicability of the consumer protection acts ("CPA") 2 to lawyers.
Finally, the article argues for the
application of consumer protection statutes to attorneys as a tool
for satisfying consumer needs and
for serving the interests of the
profession in achieving quality
control.
II.Regulation of Legal Practice
A. The Disciplinary Process
The American legal profession is
regulated chiefly through the state
and federal judiciaries, with assistance from national and local bar
associations. Since lawyers are the
driving forces in these entities, this
system is referred to as "selfregulation."
The regulators decide who is fit
for admission to the practice of law
and may impose sanctions, including disbarment, should an admitted attorney deviate from professional standards. Similarly, the

courts, with the assistance of bar
associations, establish the standards to be applied to these decisions. Most states have adopted a
set of ethical standards derived
from either the American Bar Association's Model Code of Profes-

Most states have adopted
a set of ethical standards
derived from either the
American Bar Association's
Model Code of Professional
Responsibility or Model Rules
of Professional Conduct...
the disciplinary systems are
not designed to provide
redress to individual clients.
sional Responsibility or Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.
The disciplinary procedures,
substantive rules, and interpretation of these rules vary greatly
from state to state. However, most
states confront two problems: (1)
the disciplinary systems are not
adequately funded or staffed to
deal with the "much more than
charges of theft, neglect, or the
commission of a felony," 3 and (2)
the systems are not designed to
provide redress to individual clients. 4 Additionally, the underlying
substantive rules have only indirect effect on the consumer's ability to recover for injuries inflicted
by the lawyer.5
A justice of the New Hampshire
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Supreme Court described the limited utility of the process to individual clients as follows:
We have held that "[t]he public is entitled to ample protection against the danger of any
abuse of the great powers of the
office which the public ... has
conferred upon [attorneys]."
However, the supervision of attorneys by this court or its professional conduct committee
does not afford relief to the
injured client. "The injured client can take little comfort from
the fact that the wrongdoer has
been reprimanded or suspended
or stripped of the right to prac[Citations
tice his profession."
6
omitted.]
We need not enter the debate
surrounding the effectiveness of
self-regulation for the purposes of
this article. Rather, one need only
understand that even if the system
is meeting fully its stated goal of
protecting the public, it i§ not
designed to redress a wrong suffered by a particular consumer of
legal services.
In light of this aspect of the
disciplinary system, a number of
courts have attempted to frame a
remedy within the disciplinary
process that merges the interests of
A number of courts have

attempted to frame a remedy
within the disciplinary process
that merges the interests of
the public and those of the
aggrieved consumer. The
remedy, known as restitution,
is the payment by an attorney
of the amount of money lost
by the client as a result of
the lawyer's actions.
the public and those of the aggrieved consumer. The remedy,
known as restitution, is the payment by an attorney of the amount
of money lost by the client as a
result of the lawyer's actions.
Restitution can be used in at
least two ways. First, readmission
to the bar can be expressly conditioned on payment of restitution.7
Second, a court can order restitution as an independent sanction,
even in a case where disbarment
Volume 3 Number 4/Summer, 1991

has been ordered. 8
That the use of restitution as an
adjunct to the disciplinary process
saves the aggrieved client time and
expense has not yet won it universal acceptance. At least one court
has objected to being placed in the
position of a "collection agency." 9
Other objections, such as the lack
of a nexus between the lawyer's
ability to make restitution and his
or her qualifications to practice
law, have caused commentators
and courts to question the authority to order restitution within the
disciplinary system.' 0
B. Legal Malpractice

The consumer of legal services
injured by the performance of an
attorney has traditionally resorted
to legal malpractice to recover.
However, there are many impediments to recovery in legal malpractice that render it an incomplete
source of redress. The legal mdlpractice suit may be founded on
negligence, breach of contract or
fraud. I"
1. Negligence
Negligence is the most frequent
claim against lawyers in the malpractice area. The essence of the
action is that the lawyer's failure to
conform to accepted standards of
care has caused the client injury.
The facts of the particular claim
will shape the case; thus, a claim
based on negligent advice to a
prospective client can sound in tort
based upon the duty owed to one
who seeks legal advice for purposes
whether to pursue a
of determining
2
legal action. 1
To prevail in the malpractice
action, the plaintiff must establish:
(1)The employment of or other
relationship with a lawyer which
gives rise to specific duties;' 3
(2) The lawyer failed to exercise
ordinary skill and knowledge in the
of the duty owed to
performance
plaintiff; 14
(3) The lawyer's breach of the
standard of care proximately
caused injury to the plaintiff;'
(4) The plaintiff sustained actual
injury; 16
The straightforward recitation
of the elements masks some of the
difficulty in maintaining the suit in
negligence. The second element
requires proof that the lawyers

failed to exercise the proper degree
of care in the performance of the
legal services. The plaintiff can
move forward in the lawsuit only
by establishing the applicable standard of care. To do that courts
routinely require "expert" testimony on the standard of care which
should govern the lawyer's conduct.' 7 Where the issues do not
involve questions of legal expertise, some courts do not impose the

A legal policy which allows no
recovery against a lawyer
who fails to appear on behalf
of his client, fails to attach any
value to the client's "day in
court." Yet in so many other
aspects of the law, the client's
"day in court" is thought to be
vital. The current approach to
lawyer negli.gence declares
that the accountant's bottom
line is the only concern.
burden on plaintiff to produce "expert" testimony.' 8 And where the

conduct is clearly violative of existing standards of care, some courts
excuse the plaintiff from the requirement to produce "expert"
opinion on the standard to be
applied.' 9 However, this element
of the case mandates in most situations that an injured plaintiff find
an attorney willing to testify
against a fellow attorney. There is
evidence that this requirement can
present a significant obstacle to
20

recovery.
Additionally, the requirement of
proximate cause can be overwhelming in the legal malpractice
action. In a majority of the courts,
plaintiff must show that "but for"
the lawyer's breach, the client's
injury would not have occurred. In
other words, plaintiff must prove
that had the attorney exercised the
proper degree of care, the outcome
of the litigation would have been
different. In operation the standard permits an attorney to give
incorrect advice but escape liability because plaintiff cannot prove
that the ultimate outcome would
21
have been different.
Most efforts by plaintiffs to
avoid the harshness of the "but
(continued on page 118)
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for" requirement have been unsuccessful. Illustrative of the extent
to which negligence actions fail to
meet ordinary expectations of the
consumer of legal services is Mary-

In a profession that aspires
to improve its public
reputation, it is at least
remarkable, if not totally
inconsistent, to operate a
liability system that allows
no recovery when the lawyer
fails to appear on behalf
of a client.
land Casualty Co. v. Price.22 In that
case plaintiffs attorney failed to
appear on its behalf resulting in a
default judgment. Despite the obvious causal connection between
the lawyer's failure to appear and
the default judgment, the court
required plaintiff to prove that the
legal action would have been successful had there been a full and
23
proper presentation of the case.
Plaintiffs burden is increased by
modern courts which not only require proof that plaintiff would
have obtained a judgment on the
underlying claim, but that the judghave been collectible
ment would
24
as well.
The current policy reflected in
the law governing lawyer negligence is not responsive to the legitimate expectations of the consumer of legal services. A legal policy
which allows no recovery against a
lawyer who fails to appear on behalf of his client, fails to attach any
value to the client's "day in court."
Yet in so many other aspects of the
law, the client's "day in court" is
thought to be vital. 25 The current
approach to lawyer negligence declares that the accountant's bottom
line is the only concern. In a
profession that aspires to improve
its public reputation, it is at least
remarkable, if not totally inconsistent, to operate a liability system
that allows no recovery when the
lawyer fails to appear on behalf of a
client.
This "no harm, no foul" approach fails for two reasons. First,
118

harm does occur even if it is not
measurable in terms of victory in
the underlying action. This approach damages the attorney/client
relationship, and frustrates legitimate expectations of the consumers of legal services. Second, even if
there is no "serious" harm, the
approach encourages, or at least
fails to discourage, irresponsible
behavior. Permitting lawyers to
escape all liability for irresponsible
conduct can only foster bad habits,
faulty instincts, and increased disrespect for the legal profession.
2. Breach of Contract-Express or
Implied
A consumer injured by inadequate legal services may have a
legal malpractice claim based on
express or implied contract. In an
express contract claim a lawyer
owes a contractual duty to his
client when the lawyer makes a
specific representation or promise
about the legal services. Thus,
when a lawyer represents that he or
she will perform a specific task and
fails to do so, the client has a
contractual right to insist that the
lawyer reimburse the client for any
damages that result. However, despite this general principle, the
courts refuse to enforce certain
promises. In Corceller v. Brooks,
the court refused to uphold a
promise by an attorney to win a
case on behalf of his client. The
court rejected the contract action
by a restaurant operator against his
attorney who represented that he
would win the restaurant opera26
tor's case against a franchisor.
The court found the contract theory invalid since a suit based on
guarantees of litigation results "is
foreign to the nature of the legal
' 27
profession.
The decision in Corceller frustrates the expectations of the consumer and conflicts with the treatment of similar cases outside the
law of legal malpractice. The court
found that the lawyer represented
that he would achieve specific results, yet the court held that the
client who relied on the promise
had no action for breach of contract. No inquiry was made into
the extent of the client's reliance on
the attorney's promise, the reasonableness of the promise, or the
consideration extracted based on

that promise. The breach presumably would have been actionable
had the promise been made by the
seller of any other product or service. Lawyers should not be insulated from failing to perform the
promises made to induce the client
to undertake the suit or to justify a
particular fee. A contrary policy
permits lawyers to make representations regarding the effect and
value of their services without
holding those lawyers accountable
to clients who rely on the representations.
Although decisions like Corceller limit the efficacy of a contract
action, promises not based on litigation results are more successfully
asserted as grounds for breach of
contract actions. The client may
have a contract action even if the
lawyer's conduct, with the exception of the broken promise, conformed to the ordinary standard of
care. For example, in Carroll v.
Roundtree,28 a client in a domestic
relations matter instructed his lawyer to arrange for a transfer of cash
in a lump sum payment in exchange for an executed release of

Lawyers should not be
insulated from failing to
perform the promises made to
induce the client to undertake
the suit or to justify a
particular fee. A contrary
policy permits lawyers to
make representations
regarding the effect and value
of their services without
holding those lawyers
accountable to clients who
rely on the representations.
the spouse's interest in a parcel of
property and a dismissal of a lawsuit. The client specified that the
lawyer should not transfer the cash
until receipt of the release and
dismissal.
The lawyer exercised his own
judgment without further consultation with the client and transferred
the cash to the spouse's lawyer
before obtaining the signed release
and dismissal, relying on the custom and practice among members
of the bar in the locality. The
Volume 3 Number 4/Summer, 1991
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spouse did not execute the release
or dismiss the suit. The lawyer,
assuming that the spouse had performed as agreed, gave his client
assurances that the instructions
had been followed. The client sued
his attorney for breach of contract.
The court held that the client had
established
a case for breach of
29
contract.

In the context of legal
malpractice, the general view
of the implied contract theory
provides that the lawyer
implicitly contracts to exercise
ordinary skill, knowledge, and
care in the performance of
professional services.
Despite successful contract actions like Carroll, courts appear to
favor legal malpractice claims
based on negligence, thus limiting
the availability of the contract action to the consumer of legal services. In essence the negligence
claim swallows the contract claim.
For example, in Albany Savings
Bank v. Caffry, Pontiff, Stewart,
Rhodes & Judge, P.C.,3o a bank
retained a law firm to examine the
title to a piece of property. The
firm reported that the title was free
and clear of all encumbrances and
was marketable. The bank granted
a mortgage and when the borrower
defaulted, the bank obtained title
to the property at the foreclosure
sale. Thereafter, the bank discovered that the title was not marketable. The bank sued the law firm
alleging that the firm had contracted to achieve a specific result-an
accurate report on the status of the
title. The court rejected the contract theory of the case holding
that, "the wrong complained of
consists of nothing more than the
defendant's failure to use reasonable care in exercising professional
skill. While such a breach subjects
the attorney to liability for malpractice, it does' not
give rise to a
3l
contract action.
Perhaps the generality of the
understanding between the client
and lawyer produced the difference between Carroll and Albany
Savings. More likely, the nature of
the lawyer's conduct accounted for
the difference in the cases. In CarVolume 3 Number 4/Summer, 1991

roll the lawyer's behavior was
"wrong" only because he failed to
follow his client's instructions; presumably the lawyer's handling of
the matter conformed to the local
custom and practice in relying on
the opposing attorney to determine
whether an agreement was performed. However, in Albany Savings the lawyer's conduct was
"wrong" without regard to any
contractual agreement. Having
made the commitment to search
the title, the lawyer was obligated
to use ordinary skill and care. This
duty existed regardless of contractual understanding.
It is theoretically true that the
lawyer who fails to perform according to the ordinary standards
breaches the contract of employment. However, the breach of this
duty without more, will not sustain
an action in express contract in
most jurisdictions. The allegation

If implied contract is nothing
more than a mirror image of
the negligence suit, little
protection is added for
consumers.
in an express contract action must
be that a specific promise was
made and not delivered. 32 In the
strict sense, the general agreement
of the lawyer is to provide services,
and unless the lawyer utterly fails
to provide service, the express contract has not been breached. It is
true that the failure to perform
with ordinary care may well implicate an implied term of the contract which obligates the lawyer to
perform in accordance with general standards of the profession.
However, that failure gives rise to
an action in implied contract, not
express contract.
In the context of legal malpractice, the general view of the implied contract theory provides that
the lawyer implicitly contracts to
exercise ordinary skill, knowledge,
and care in the performance of
professional services.3 3 These implied obligations serve much the
same purpose as the standards in
tort; they establish something of a
minimum standard for behavior.
The proof of the implied obligation
is the same proof required for
establishing the duty in a negli-

gence action. Therefore, the implied contract action may be in
essence the same claim as the negligence action.
If implied contract is nothing
more than a mirror image of the
negligence suit, little protection is

Lawyers may properly be
denied some of the latitude
given to sellers of other
products and services.
added for consumers. Courts have
not explored other implied terms
of the contract for legal services. Is
there, or ought there to be, an
implied condition that the fees
charged for the services will be
reasonable; or can the law of unconscionably gross price disparity
be applied to the contract for legal
services? Should the contract for
legal services contain an implied
term that the services will be provided within a reasonable time?
The point of these inquiries is to
raise the question of whether the
general expectations imposed on
the contract for the sale of goods
and services in other areas of commercial transactions ought to be
equally enforceable in contracts for
legal services.
3. Fraud or Deceit
In order to state an action for
fraud the consumer must allege
that the attorney had knowledge of

Attorneys have long sought
exemption from outside
regulation by entities other
than bar associations and
courts. Such treatment is
sought to be justified by the
assertion that attorneys are
engaged in a "learned
profession," rather than in
"trade or commerce."
a falsehood and an intent to de-

prive another of rights by means of
the falsehood. The fraud action
involves some form of dishonesty-the most egregious conduct for
an attorney. The opportunity for
consumer relief would be relatively
small if actions against lawyers
(continued on page 120)
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were limited to that narrow band
of situations in which the client is
intentionally deceived by an attorney in order to deprive the client of
a valuable right.
While it is true that lawyer liability for fraud is the same as the
liability of nonlawyers for similar
actions, 3 4 the fact that an attorney
operates under a special relationship with the client casts the lawyer's misrepresentation in a light
somewhat different from the misrepresentation that an ordinary
seller of services might make to a
purchaser of those services. Lawyers may properly be denied some
of the latitude given to sellers of
other products and services. For
example, the nonlawyer will most
likely not be held accountable for
misleading others with an opinion.
In contrast, because an attorney's
opinion carries special weight, a
client has a cause of action against
an attorney who offers an opinion
he knows to be false. 35 Moreover,
the lawyer may be held liable for
fraud when the lawyer's opinion is
not known to be false when offered
but is merely the product of recklessness.3 6 However, a client whose
claim is based on the fact that her
lawyer gave bad legal advice has
not stated a cause of action for
fraud.37 Although ordinarily stringent standards for actions in fraud
are relaxed in actions against lawyers, consumers of legal services
cannot use actions for fraud as a
substitute for negligence actions.
III. Applicability of Consumer
Protection Statutes to Attorneys
Under Current Law
A. Learned Profession Exemption
Attorneys have long sought exemption from outside regulation
by entities other than bar associations and courts. Such treatment is
sought to be justified by the assertion that attorneys are engaged in a
"learned profession," rather than
in "trade or commerce." This distinction is important, attorneys
contend, because the goal of a
profession is service to the public,
rather than enhancing profit.
The doctrinal underpinnings of
learned profession doctrine were
120

removed when the Supreme Court
held, in 1975, that federal antitrust
laws apply to anticompetitive activities of bar associations. The
Supreme Court stated in Goldfarb
v. VirginiaState Barthat:
In arguing that learned professions are not "trade or commerce" the County Bar seeks a
total exclusion from antitrust
regulation. Whether state regulation is active or dormant, real
or theoretical, lawyers would be
able to adopt anticompetitive
practices with impunity. We
cannot find support for the
proposition that Congress intended such sweeping exclusion.
The nature of an occupation,
standing alone, does not provide
sanctuary from the Sherman
Act, nor is the public service
aspect of professional practice
controlling in determining
whether § 1 includes profes38
sions.

Close examination of some
recent cases holding CPA to
be inapplicable to lawyers
demonstrates flawed
statutory construction and
vestiges of the "learned
profession exemption."
The Court two years later in
Bates v. State Bar ofArizona, commented that the "belief that lawyers are somehow 'above trade' has
' 39
become an anachronism.

While not so holding, Goldfarb
and Bates strongly imply that federal regulatory laws may also apply
to the legal profession. In fact, the
Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") has specifically applied
the Federal Trade Commission Act
to the practice of law. The FTC
held that "an attorney who had
prepared a dunning letter and had
participated in a collection scheme
violative of 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) ...
violated the FTC Act." 40
In light of the above-cited authority it would seem safe to assume that the "learned profession"
exemption is no longer a viable
doctrine. Therefore, any exclusion
of the practice of law from coverage of CPA must be based, if at all,
on a specific statutory exemption
or on the inapplicability of the

statute to the facts of a particular
case. However, close examination
of some recent cases holding CPA
to be inapplicable to lawyers demonstrates flawed statutory construction and vestiges of the
"learned profession exemption."
B. Statutory Exemptions
The relevant inquiry in determining the scope of consumer protection statutes is legislative intent.
Goldfarb did not bar a legislature
from exempting a profession from
CPA coverage. Rather, the court
looked to whether there was clear
legislative intent to exclude the
legal profession from statutory
coverage. The learned profession
doctrine itself was deemed insufficient to compel exclusion.
This, of course, leaves legislative
bodies free, as a policy matter, to
include or exclude lawyers from
CPA coverage. For example, Maryland has, in clear language, decided
to exclude attorneys and various
other classes of persons from coverage. 4' As will be discussed below,
the authors believe sound public
policy supports the inclusion of
attorneys within the scope of CPA.
However, absent a successful constitutional challenge, a topic beyond the scope of this article, legislative bodies are free to make the
decision on the scope of their statutes.
C. Judicially Created Exemptions
A number of courts have limited
the applicability of CPA to attorneys through statutory interpretation. The approach taken by the
New Hampshire Supreme Court
may provide a method for evaluating these types of cases.
42
The New Hampshire statute
does not contain the clear statutory
exemption provided in Maryland's
CPA; nevertheless, the state supreme court has exempted attorneys from the reach of the CPA.
The reasoning of the case in which
this was decided appears, on close
examination, to be based on the
lingering notion of law as a
"learned profession."
In Rousseau v. Eshleman, a 3-2
majority of the New Hampshire
Supreme Court held attorneys exempt from the application of the
consumer protection statute. 43 The
court's interpretation was based on
Volume 3 Number 4/Summer, 1991
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Lhe provision of the law exempting
"[t]rade or commerce otherwise
permitted under laws as administered by any regulatory board or
officer acting under statutory authority of this state. ' 44 Since the
New Hampshire Supreme Court's
Professional Conduct Committee
controls discipline of attorneys, the
court reasoned that the statutory
exemption applied to all situations
45
involving attorney conduct.
The facts in Rousseau I warrant
examination. The plaintiff consulted with Attorney Eshleman regarding the purchase of real estate.
Upon the recommendation of the
attorney, plaintiff purchased certain commercial real estate. Eshleman proposed and subsequently
executed a contingent fee arrangement with the purchaser and represented that this was the "usual"
practice. Evidence at trial indicated that this assertion was false and
could create a conflict of interest.
In addition, the attorney failed,
despite having knowledge of the
fact before the closing; to correct
his advice regarding the assumability of certain mortgages.
The buyer suffered a substantial
loss in the transaction and sued the
attorney alleging causes of action
in legal malpractice, negligent misrepresentation and unfair and deceptive trade practices. The jury
found the defendant negligent and
held that he had committed unfair
and deceptive practices.
On appeal, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court held the attorney
exempt from CPA and granted a
new trial on the other claims due to
the possible prejudice caused by
submitting the CPA issue to the
jury. 46 This result was severely
criticized by the dissenters, who
believed that the commercial aspects of law should be covered by
CPA. 47 However, two more fundamental flaws in the decisioni.e., the overly broad interpretation
of the exemption clause and its
relationship to the learned profession exemption-were given insufficient attention.
The first problem with the majority's interpretation is that it is
not true to the language of the
statute. The applicable section exempts trade or commerce "permitted" under the laws of a reguVolume 3 Number 4/Summer, 1991

lating body. 48 As Justice Thayer in
his concurring opinion in Rousseau II pointed out, "neither party
argues that the conduct com-

plained of [the] misleading and
deceptive setting of legal fees was
permitted by a regulatory board or
officer. ' 49 Therefore, the court's
ruling must be understood to bar
application of CPA in cases involving any person or entity subject to
regulatory authority. Given the
large number of industries currently subject to some form of regulation, this interpretation is certainly
overbroad. It also creates an anomalous situation. Here, the supreme
court's regulatory body, which is

designed to protect the public, is
unable to provide a monetary remedy to the client due to the nature
of the regulatory process. Despite
this inability to fully protect the
consumer through the regulatory

If lawyers are to be exempted
from the general rules that
apply to others engaged in
business, it should be
because there exists a sound
policy reason to distinguish
lawyers from others who deal
with the public.
process, the mere fact that regulation exists, deprives the person
whom the disciplinary system is
designed to protect, of the protections afforded any other consumer. 50

More fundamentally, however,
the court seems to base its exemption on the attorney's privilege to
self-regulate. This form of regulation, as has been previously discussed, is authorized in large part
by the principles underlying law as
a profession rather than a business.
If lawyers are to be exempted from
the general rules that apply to
others engaged in business, it
should be because there exists a
sound policy reason to distinguish
lawyers from others who deal with
the public. The reasoning of Rousseau I neither provides any insight
into what those reasons are nor
addresses adequately the consequences of such decisions to consumers of legal services. We assert
in section IV, infra, that no such

basis for distinction exists.
D. Noncommercial Actual Practice
of Law Exemption
A number of courts have struggled to develop a doctrinal basis
for applying the CPA to attorneys
which still allows for professional
discretion. These courts posit a
distinction between the commercial and noncommercial aspects of
law. In Short v. Demopolis,5" the
Supreme Court of Washington
held that certain aspects of the
legal profession, such as the pricing
of legal services, billing and collection methods and practices surrounding the obtaining, retaining
and dismissing of clients are "legitimate concerns of the public
which are properly subject to the
CPA. 512 The respondents in Demopolis were members of a law
firm who sued Demopolis for
breach of an express contract to
pay for legal services. Demopolis
asserted a number of counterclaims, including unfair and deceptive practices, in violation of
Washington's CPA.5
The Washington Supreme Court
found respondents liable under
Washington's CPA and stated that
the legislative intent of the act was
to apply to "every person who
conducts unfair or deceptive acts
in any trade or commerce. '5 4 The
court held that entrepreneurial aspects of law fall within the act's
"sphere of 'trade or commerce'." 55
Demopolis's other counterclaims,
however, were held to be beyond
the scope of the state's CPA. These
claims related to the respondents'
alleged failure to perform certain
non-entrepreneurial functions of
the law, such as filing a judgment
in a timely manner.5 6 The court
stated that these claims related to
the "actual practice of law" and
amounted to allegations of negligence and malpractice. They were
57
therefore exempt from the CPA.
The distinction between "actual
practice" and the commercial aspects of law certainly has a greater
doctrinal claim of legitimacy than
the approaches previously identified. These courts distinguish one
aspect of the legal profession from
another by drawing a line between
commercial acts and those acts
(continued on page 122)
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which involve professional judgment. Analytically, the distinction
between conduct involving judgment and acts involving the commercial dimensions of the legal
practice may seem appealing.
However, if the distinction is
meaningful, it must be based on
something unique about the judgments of lawyers. After all, the law
does not allow the judgments of the
sellers of other products and services to escape the reach of the
CPA. For example, the law does
not allow the seller of real estate to
separate his judgments about the
market, financing arrangements,
and the like from the more tangible
aspects of the transaction-like
transfer of the property itself.
The court in Demopolis declined
to apply the CPA to the "actual
practice of law" in part based on
the reasoning that such application
would alter the standard of care
owed by lawyers to their clients.
Liability under the CPA does not
require any showing of fault. It
follows that if an act or practice
resulted in deception, an attorney
would be liable whether or not due
care was exercised. Therefore, it is
argued that application of the CPA
to the "actual practice of law" may
require an attorney to guarantee
far more than due care in providing legal services.
The application of the CPA
would not make attorneys insurers
of their opinions. These type of
statutes only prohibit actions that
are unfair or deceptive, not merely
wrong. An attorney who chooses
between two courses of action after
reasonable consideration, who explains the consequences of the decisions to the client and then implements the chosen course does
not violate the statute merely because the choice later turns out to
be wrong. Furthermore, including
attorneys under the CPA does not
mean that the client will necessarily win the lawsuit. Of course, one
could argue that the threat of vexatious litigation will increase the
cost of legal services without any
benefit to the client. However, at
this point no evidence exists to
support that contention. Addition-

ally, the history of consumer litigation in other areas does not suggest
vexatious litigation is a necessary
result.
E. Application of the CPA Without
the Noncommercial Exemption
A few courts have held attorneys
liable under consumer protection
statutes in situations involving the
"actual practice of law." For example, the Texas Supreme Court
upheld an appellate court decision
finding an attorney liable for consumer protection act violations for
failing to obtain timely a name
change for a client's daughter.5 8
The appellate court stated that
because an attorney "sells legal
services and the client purchases
them," the attorney, unless specifically exempted by statute, is subject to the provisions of the CPA.
Under the Texas statute, physi-

The principal effect of
application of the CAP would
be to impose potential liability
for the breach of professional
standards in those cases
where consumer injury
standards can be satisfied.
cians and health care providers are
expressly exempted. The appellate
court reasoned that because the
legislature tabled an amendment to
the act which would have exempted all professionals, it was reasonable to conclude that the legislature
intended the act to cover legal
services.5 9
Likewise, the Massachusetts appellate court has applied the act to
the legal profession without regard
to the actual practice of law distinction. Brown v. Gerstein involved a claim against an attorney
for failure to file suit against a bank
to restrain a foreclosure. The attorney involved allegedly made a
number of false representations to
the client. 60 The court held that "in
circumstances like those here present the practice of law constitutes
"trade or commerce' under the
state's consumer protection stat6
ute. '

IV. Justification for Attorney
Liability Under The CPA
A. The Consumer Protection
Statutes
1. The Historical Basis
The state legislatures fashioned
the consumer protection acts to
address major problems in the
world of consumer transactions. In
a substantial number of transactions the consumer fell victim to
unequal bargaining and economic
power. The lack of bargaining power resulted, in part, from the inaccessibility and high cost of information for the consumer.
Consequently, the consumer typically relied on those with whom he
dealt. At the same time, a lack of
economic power made it difficult
for the consumer to employ costly
legal representation to redress the
frustration of reasonable expectations. In light of these realities, the
consumer protection laws were
fashioned to articulate common
standards for fairness and honesty
in order to uphold reasonable consumer expectations. Further, in order to make remedies readily available to consumers injured by
deceptive practices, the statutes
reduced the barriers to recovery by
imposing the cost of prosecuting
the claim on the seller.
2. The Typical Statutory
Language
Generally, state legislatures patterned consumer protection statutes after federal trade regulation
law. The New Hampshire Consumer Protection statute employs
language typical of most state statutes. The act provides: "It shall be
unlawful for any person to use any
unfair method of competition or
any unfair or deceptive practice in
the conduct of any trade or commerce within this state." 62 The
express language of the statute
eliminates the argument that application of the CPA will force
attorneys to guarantee the correctness of their opinions. In order to
recover, a client must show more
than an incorrect opinion offered
by the attorney; the client must
establish that the attorney's conduct was unfair or deceptive.
The statutory terms unfairness
and deception are intentionally
broad due to the impossibility of
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listing all unfair and deceptive
practices in a statute or regulation.

Since enactment of the statutes, the
task of giving meaning to the terms
has been one for the courts. 63 Critics of applying the consumer protection statutes to attorneys assert
that the concept of "unfairness"
seems so vague that uncertainty is
virtually guaranteed. In light of
past success with the statutes, this
argument lacks merit. The application of the law of unfairness and
deception to lawyers would be developed just as the law based on
those concepts has been developed
for other industries-by the courts
in the context of practical experience. The conduct of honest business has not been seriously hampered by the application of the
statute. Likewise, it is not realistic
to assume that the judges interpreting the law will be insensitive to the
legitimate concerns of the legal
profession.
Furthermore, the law of unfairness has taken on relatively specific form over the years. The FTC
and the United States Supreme
Court have given approval to an
approach for determining whether
a particular act or practice is unfair. These factors are: (1) whether
the practice injures consumers; (2)
whether the practice violates established public policy; and (3) whether the practice is unethical or unscrupulous. 64 Those factors are
stated and restated with increasing
specificity and elaboration in the
FTC statement of policy and
guidelines for enforcement. 65 Each
of the criteria has a developed
body of law which represents further refinement. The historical development of specific criteria for
these statutes makes it apparent
that consumer protection laws will
not subject lawyers to unlimited
liability.
Implementing the public policy
criteria for defining unfair and
deceptive in the context of the legal
profession may be easier than in
the typical business context. Most
states already have specific professional regulations in place which
represent the established public
policy standards for attorney conduct. The public policy reflected by
the professional regulations would
constitute a standard of conduct to
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which lawyers could be held. For
example, a lawyer who violates the
competency standards of the Rules
of Professional Conduct would violate an established public policy
and would be held accountable for
the consumer injury. 66 Thus, the
principal effect of application of
the CPA would be to impose potential liability for the breach of
professional standards in those
cases where consumer injury standards can be satisfied.
The American Bar Association
Code of Professional Responsibility was not developed with the
67
imposition of liability in mind.
The more recent American Bar
Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct expressly renounce the use of ethical standards
as grounds for civil liability. The
"Scope" provisions of the Model
Rules state:

Nothing in the CPA would
make a lawyer the insurer of
his legal opinions. It is not
unfair or deceptive to offer,
after careful consideration, an
opinion which later turns out
to be wrong.
Violation of a Rule should
not give rise to a cause of action
nor should it create any presumption that a legal duty has
been breached... They are not
designed to be a basis for civil
liability... The fact that a rule is
a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a
lawyer under the administration
of a disciplinary authority, does
not imply that an antagonist in a
collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek
en68
forcement of the Rule.
Regardless of the fact that the
drafters intended that the Rules
not be available for clients frustrated by a lawyer's violations of the
Rules, the use of the professional
codes of ethics as a supplement
from which to define fairness is not
uncommon.
Use of the Rules of Conduct in
the "unfair and deceptive" analysis may serve the best interests of
the profession in addition to protecting the consumer. Currently

there is a debate regarding the
extent to which the professional
disciplinary system operates to adequately enforce the standards of
legal practice represented by the
Rules or the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It seems clear that
most state disciplinary systems are
understaffed and underfunded.
Consequently, violations of the
rules go unchecked and the legal
profession falls short of its selfregulatory goal of protecting the
public through quality control of
legal services.
In areas other than the regulation of lawyers, Congress and state
legislatures have thought that empowering "private attorneys general" to bring individual claims
was an efficient and effective way
of policing the marketplace. If the
legal profession is serious about
quality control, the time has come
to give serious consideration to
empowering clients to enforce
those standards through civil actions. As one studies the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct,
there appear to be very few obligations that could not be made operative as standards by which unfairness could be established under the
69
consumer protection laws.
Would lawyers behave differently
if they were exposed to liability for
the failure to adhere to those standards? Would the cost of legal
services be affected by that exposure? These questions and many
more ought to be explored in a
search for a way to serve two
worthy objectives: providing a
remedy for injured consumers of
legal services, and improving the
quality of legal services.
B. Resulting Changes
1. Altered Standard of Care
Those who argue against applying the CPA to the "actual practice
of law" claim that lawyers' judgments cannot form the basis of
CPA liability because the lawyers
would effectively be required to
insure the correctness of their
opinions and therefore, would be
unable to function in their traditional role as counselor.70 Implicit
in that claim is the concern that the
standard of care owed to clients by
attorneys would be altered.
(continued on page 124)
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Nothing in the CPA would make
a lawyer the insurer of his legal
opinions. It is not unfair or deceptive to offer, after careful consideration, an opinion which later turns
out to be wrong. The lawyer would
only be the insurer of the correctness of his opinion for purposes of
the CPA, if his opinion was offered
in such a way that it deceived the
consumer. Surely the profession
which makes its living on the spoken and written word is capable of
offering opinions in a form which
adequately communicates to reasonable persons that there is a
margin of error in the advice being
given. Far from impairing the ability of the lawyer to function as a
counselor, a law which in effect
requires full disclosure to the client
of the possibilities surrounding the
opinion offered could only serve to
empower the client by assuring
that the risks of error are understood and accounted for in the
client's ultimate decision. In fact,
the American Bar Association
Mode Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted in some form in at
least thirty-five states, require lawyers to communicate with their
clients in a manner that makes
informed decision-making possible. 7' Undeniably, the standards of
fairness, honesty, and accuracy in
the consumer protection statutes
would alter the standards of care
owed by lawyers to their clients. To
the extent that the existing theories
for holding lawyers accountable to
their clients permit lawyers to engage in unfair and deceptive practices without incurring liability,
some changes ought to be considered.
2. The Economic Impact
The plea that the CPA would
change the standard of care and
make it impossible for business to
survive is not novel. The same
claim was made by the financial
services industry in response to
regulation. Indeed, merchant
groups ranging from direct sellers
to auto dealers and manufacturers
have claimed that the CPA would
put them out of business. As history has shown, those claims were
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almost always overstated. On the
other hand, there is no question
that adoption of a new standard of
care would entail costs. In order to
meet the new duty owed to clients,
lawyers may be required to expend
time and effort for which they may
have to bill clients. However, the
mere fact that there is a cost associated with a change should not,
without more, eliminate the possibility of change. The proper question is whether the benefit outweighs the cost.
The economics of a change of
the sort proposed here-that lawyers be held to the same standards
as other sellers of services-are
straightforward. At present each
consumer bears the full burden of
an injury when a lawyer engages in
a practice for which there is no
practical recovery under the restrictive policies of legal malpractice. There is currently no economic incentive for the lawyer to guard
against such injuries other than the
competitive disadvantage that results from unhappy customers. As
long as the lawyer's conduct does
not alter the outcome of the representation in any substantial way,
there is presently no direct economic accountability. Imposition
of the consumer protection statutes to lawyers could expose them
to liability and provide an economic incentive to change present practices to avoid liability. Preventive
devices to limit the attorney's exposure to liability may impose a
cost on each consumer in the form
of increased fees. Imposing the cost
of those preventive devices on the
consuming public represents a
spreading of the costs that formerly
were imposed on individual consumers. The actual ability of the
lawyer to pass the costs of the
preventive devices on to the consumer will depend upon price competition and the efficiency with
which the lawyer can meet the new
standards.
V. Conclusion

Despite the fact that the practice
of law has become more of a
business, most states do not apply
consumer protection statutes to
attorneys. The legal profession has
made changes in its disciplinary
system to improve the quality of

legal services. However, even if
this self-regulatory system is effective, it does not provide redress to
individual consumers injured by
inadequate legal services. The traditional common law remedy of
legal malpractice entails many impediments to recovery for the aggrieved consumer. For this reason
the application of consumer protection acts to the legal profession
will supplement traditional common law remedies to provide additional relief to consumers. Further,
application of the consumer protection acts to attorneys will serve
the best interests of the profession
by allowing more complete enforcement of the standards of professional conduct.
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